We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future directions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the next years.
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
of Cognition, Epistemology of the Artificial.
The scientific vision of the early Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be successfully synthesized by the words of Pat Langley: "AI aimed at understanding and reproducing in computational systems the full range of intelligent behaviour observed by humans" (Langley, 2012) . This approach, known as the 'cognitivist' approach to AI according to the terminological distinction provided 5 by Vernon (Vernon, 2014) , borrowed its original inspiration -from a historical perspective-from the methodological approach developed by scholars in Cybernetics (Cordeschi, 1991) . In this perspective, the computational simulation of biological processes was assumed to play a central epistemological role in the development and refinement of theories about the elements characterizing the 10 nature of intelligent behaviour in natural and artificial systems. As a consequence, it was also crucial for the development of artificial solutions inspired by human processes and heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) .
Likewise, thanks to the computational approach to Cognitive Science, in-telligent systems based on computational models and architectures of cognition 15 have been also proposed with the aim at providing a deeper understanding of human thinking, as originally suggested in the manifesto of the Information Processing Psychology (IPP) (Newell & Simon, 1972) . motion and development of this movement, at least in Europe (Lieto & Cruciani, 2013; Lieto et al., 2014; Lieto & Cruciani, 2015; Lieto & Radicioni, 2015) .
This sort of 'cognitive renaissance' of AI, essentially, still considers the "cog-nition in the loop" approach as a useful one to detect and unveil novel and hidden aspects of the cognitive theories by building properly designed compu-45 tational models of cognition useful to progress towards a deeper understanding of the foundational roots of intelligence (both in natural and artificial systems).
An important methodological aspect to consider within this framework regards the explanatory role played by such artificial models (and systems) with respect to the target natural cognitive systems they take as source of inspiration. In son. In this case, in fact, the adoption of the expression "cognitive system" represents a misuse). On the other hand, since it is currently not possible to reproduce a realistic strong equivalence between a computational model/system and a target natural system (such as human cognition), 3 the only way to make progress is based on the development of plausible structural models of our cog-60 nition based on a more constrained equivalence between AI procedures and their corresponding cognitive processes. Only models and systems based on the design constraints proposed by the "structural" approach 4 can be considered good 2 Functionalism was introduced in the philosophy of mind by Putnam in his seminal article entitled Minds and Machines (Putnam, 1960) . In its more radical formulation it postulates the sufficiency, from an epistemological perspective, of a weak equivalence between cognitive processes and AI procedures and propose that, from an explanatory point of view, the relation between "natural mind" and "artificial software" can be based purely on a macroscopic equivalence of the functional organization of the two systems. This position has been widely criticized in the literature in the last decades (also by Putnam himself). 3 This phenomenon is known as the "Wiener paradox", and can be summarized through
Wiener's own words about the fact that "the best material model of a cat is another or possibly the same cat" (Rosenblueth & Wiener, 1945) . In short, this "paradox" advocates for the need of the realization of proxy-models, not replicas, of a given natural system by pointing out the difficulty of such challenge. 4 Differently from the functionalism, the structural approach claims for the epistemological "proxyies" of a the target cognitive system taken as inspiration, and can play an explanatory role about it (Cordeschi, 2002; Mi lkowski, 2013) .
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According to such approach, these kinds of models and systems can be useful both to advance the science of AI in terms of technological achievements (e.g.
in tasks that are easily solvable for humans but very hard to solve for machines, such as -for example -in common sense reasoning) and to play the role of "computational experiments", able to provide insights and results useful in refining 70 or rethinking theoretical aspects concerning the target biological system used as source of inspiration. This perspective -along with the many challenges it forces us to accept-represents the pillar of this Special Issue and, at different levels of granularity, the papers selected in this issue illustrate systems that can be ascribed to this approach of cognitive AI. We are indebted to the referees of this special issue that helped us in the selection process. We thank: Agnese Augello, Cristina Bosco, Eduardo Datteri,
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Marcello Frixione, Anna Jordanous, Othalia Larue, Alessandro Oltramari, Viviana Patti, Alessio Plebe, Viola Schiaffonati, Sara Tonelli and Fabio Massimo
Zanzotto.
